Criterion #1 : A good argument must have true premises
Criterion #2 : A good argument must be either valid or strong
Criterion #3 : The premises of a good argument must not beg the question
Criterion #4 : The premises of a good argument must be plausible and relevant to the conclusion
Conclusion: A good argument is an argument that is either valid or strong, and with plausible premises that are true, do not beg the question, and are relevant to the conclusion.
Friday, February 18, 2011
http://www.unco.edu/philosophy/arg.html
An argument is a good argument in the strict sense of the term just in case it is either (a) a strong inductive argument with true premises or (b) a sound argument the conclusion of which isn’t included among the premises and the validity of which isn’t merely a function of its conclusion’s being a statement that couldn’t conceivably be false. (Note 1: the point of the first qualification in (b) is that circular pieces of reasoning shouldn’t qualify as good arguments (even though they are valid), and the point of the second is that we’re equally far from having a good argument in any such ridiculous “proof” of a mathematical or logical truth as, say, “Grass is green, hence 2 + 2 = 4” or “Whales aren’t fish, so Plato was a philosopher unless he wasn’t.” Note 2: valid arguments and strong inductive arguments are sometimes called “good arguments” even though they have false premises simply to indicate that the inferences they embody can’t be faulted on logical grounds alone. Maybe we should say that such arguments are good arguments in a loose sense of the term. Nothing can be faulted about the reasoning in such arguments.)
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
http://zhenchen.pageout.net/page.dyn/student/course/instructor_note?note_id=7199702&course_id=109238
III. The Argument from Relativity (Disagreement) (451-)
1. There are variation and radical disagreements in moral area.
2. If there are objective values or moral facts by appeal to which moral disagreements can be resolved, those disagreements or some of those should disappear.
3. But they still exist.
4. Therefore, there are no moral facts.
Mackie recognizes that disagreements in science about a certain issue do not imply that there are no objective facts. However, he insists that disagreement in ethics is more fundamental than that in science. The former is not resolvable but the latter is. In science, disagreement is due to inadequate evidence. Once we get adequate evidence, the disagreement is solved. But this is not true in ethics. In ethics, disagreement about moral codes reflects people's ways of life. "... it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy."
His point is that the actual variations in the moral codes are better explained by the hypothesis that there are no objective values, i.e., the variations reflect ways of life than the hypothesis that they express perceptions of objective values. There is no separate or supervenient moral reality. If moral realists want to defend their position that there are objective values, the burden of proof is on them.
One objection to Mackie's view is that another better explanation of variations in the moral codes is that: there are some, perhaps implicit, general basic principles accepted in all societies. When they are married with differing concrete circumstances, etc., they produce different specific rules with some sort of plausibility.
But Mackie insists that: a. it is far away from finding those basic rules; b. there are different moral judgments on the same things not because they exemplify general rules but because those things arouse immediately different responses in different peoples-moral intuitions.
Some realists argue that even if moral disagreements are not resolvable, this does not mean that there are no objective values. They claim that moral values are functions of human well-being and flourishing.
1. There are variation and radical disagreements in moral area.
2. If there are objective values or moral facts by appeal to which moral disagreements can be resolved, those disagreements or some of those should disappear.
3. But they still exist.
4. Therefore, there are no moral facts.
Mackie recognizes that disagreements in science about a certain issue do not imply that there are no objective facts. However, he insists that disagreement in ethics is more fundamental than that in science. The former is not resolvable but the latter is. In science, disagreement is due to inadequate evidence. Once we get adequate evidence, the disagreement is solved. But this is not true in ethics. In ethics, disagreement about moral codes reflects people's ways of life. "... it is that people approve of monogamy because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy."
His point is that the actual variations in the moral codes are better explained by the hypothesis that there are no objective values, i.e., the variations reflect ways of life than the hypothesis that they express perceptions of objective values. There is no separate or supervenient moral reality. If moral realists want to defend their position that there are objective values, the burden of proof is on them.
One objection to Mackie's view is that another better explanation of variations in the moral codes is that: there are some, perhaps implicit, general basic principles accepted in all societies. When they are married with differing concrete circumstances, etc., they produce different specific rules with some sort of plausibility.
But Mackie insists that: a. it is far away from finding those basic rules; b. there are different moral judgments on the same things not because they exemplify general rules but because those things arouse immediately different responses in different peoples-moral intuitions.
Some realists argue that even if moral disagreements are not resolvable, this does not mean that there are no objective values. They claim that moral values are functions of human well-being and flourishing.
http://www.logical-operator.com/pl541lecture2.html
3. The Argument from Relativity
(e) A famous discussion in Mackie. He starts with an unarguable premise:
The argument from relativity has as it premiss the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community.
(f) IMRealists claim that the variation occurs because of different and mostly (or all) wrong perceptions of the existing mind-independent ethical properties. Mackie says that the simpler explanation is that people are raised to live and think differently and that that is all that can be said on the matter. The onus is on IMRealists to explain why their theory is better. But there is a lot more to say.... (First thoughts: Where does the onus lie? Who says that Mackieπs is the simpler theory? Even if it is, arenπt we after the true theory? Although åsimpleπ is good, the true theory might be åcomplexπ.)
(g) Side-issue of modality. Mackie notes that IMRealists could counter by distinguishing between specific and general principles (codes, rules, dispositions, etc.). General rules are mind-independent but they receive different expression because of geography, climate, history, etc. Mackie says that moral objectivists will then be committed to the contingency of ethical properties (if society had been different then different ethical properties would have existed). As Brink points out (1984), modality is a red herring. We are interested in the mind-independence or otherwise of ethical properties that do exist, supposedly, in this world.
(h) Hang on. There are important polarized and long-running debates in science. We donπt think that their existence casts doubt on the mind-independence of scientific properties and relations. (Weπll assume for this module. Even if we donπt believe in scientific properties and even if it is because of disputes, their existence seems more plausible in the face of disagreement than ethical propertiesπ existence.) Ethics might be different because ethical debates seem irresolvable, whereas scientific ones donπt. So, IMRealists need to explain ethical debates. (See Brink (1984) as well.)
(i) Disagreement over nonethical facts
(ii) Incommensurability. E.g. of building a road. Existence of incommensurable values doesnπt cast doubt on the fact that those values might be mind-independent.
But (i) and (ii) might not be enough. We still want to say that there can be cases where all of the nonethical facts are known, there is no incommensurability and where disputants can still disagree. So, we still need to show that the cause of disagreement is that most, if not all, people has misperceived the ethical properties. How to do this? In science we assume that epistemic access is possible so that we can know which judgements are correct. The same seems to be true for IMRealists ≠ they have to show that ethics is similar to science in this regard.
(i) But, that doesnπt seem that troubling. There seems nothing weird about the possibility that one can know that a situation might have a mind-independent ethical property without knowing if it does or what it is. After all, if there are scientific properties, then it seems fine to assume that they are mind-independent. The point being that it isnπt the knowing part that seems troubling here, but rather the type of property itself
(e) A famous discussion in Mackie. He starts with an unarguable premise:
The argument from relativity has as it premiss the well-known variation in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community.
(f) IMRealists claim that the variation occurs because of different and mostly (or all) wrong perceptions of the existing mind-independent ethical properties. Mackie says that the simpler explanation is that people are raised to live and think differently and that that is all that can be said on the matter. The onus is on IMRealists to explain why their theory is better. But there is a lot more to say.... (First thoughts: Where does the onus lie? Who says that Mackieπs is the simpler theory? Even if it is, arenπt we after the true theory? Although åsimpleπ is good, the true theory might be åcomplexπ.)
(g) Side-issue of modality. Mackie notes that IMRealists could counter by distinguishing between specific and general principles (codes, rules, dispositions, etc.). General rules are mind-independent but they receive different expression because of geography, climate, history, etc. Mackie says that moral objectivists will then be committed to the contingency of ethical properties (if society had been different then different ethical properties would have existed). As Brink points out (1984), modality is a red herring. We are interested in the mind-independence or otherwise of ethical properties that do exist, supposedly, in this world.
(h) Hang on. There are important polarized and long-running debates in science. We donπt think that their existence casts doubt on the mind-independence of scientific properties and relations. (Weπll assume for this module. Even if we donπt believe in scientific properties and even if it is because of disputes, their existence seems more plausible in the face of disagreement than ethical propertiesπ existence.) Ethics might be different because ethical debates seem irresolvable, whereas scientific ones donπt. So, IMRealists need to explain ethical debates. (See Brink (1984) as well.)
(i) Disagreement over nonethical facts
(ii) Incommensurability. E.g. of building a road. Existence of incommensurable values doesnπt cast doubt on the fact that those values might be mind-independent.
But (i) and (ii) might not be enough. We still want to say that there can be cases where all of the nonethical facts are known, there is no incommensurability and where disputants can still disagree. So, we still need to show that the cause of disagreement is that most, if not all, people has misperceived the ethical properties. How to do this? In science we assume that epistemic access is possible so that we can know which judgements are correct. The same seems to be true for IMRealists ≠ they have to show that ethics is similar to science in this regard.
(i) But, that doesnπt seem that troubling. There seems nothing weird about the possibility that one can know that a situation might have a mind-independent ethical property without knowing if it does or what it is. After all, if there are scientific properties, then it seems fine to assume that they are mind-independent. The point being that it isnπt the knowing part that seems troubling here, but rather the type of property itself
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